Soft power and joint arming: How Middle Eastern interests converge in times of war

Before the ongoing Iranian war seized global attention, Tehran had, for months, been charting a course for expansion into Africa, capitalizing on Western retrenchment from the continent—particularly that of France.

Notably, Iran has at times found itself aligned alongside Gulf states in certain crises, such as Sudan and Yemen, where interests converged on common ground and through parallel methods.

Dani Citrinowicz, senior researcher in the Iran and the Shiite Axis Program at the Institute for National Security Studies, notes that in April 2025, “Iran hosted 700 business leaders from 38 African countries as part of the third Iran–Africa summit. These activities not only underscore the importance Iran attaches to Africa, but more significantly highlight its desire to exploit Western withdrawal from the continent. This development, coupled with the United States’ intention to significantly scale back its diplomatic and military presence in Africa, has created a vacuum enabling Tehran to expand its economic, diplomatic, and religious influence across the continent.”

In Sudan, Iran found itself standing alongside Saudi Arabia in support of the Sudanese army front led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his allies from the Muslim Brotherhood and various armed movements. In the Horn of Africa, Tehran intensified efforts to expand its influence in cooperation with the Houthis.

In short, Citrinowicz affirms that for months Iran has been “reaping significant gains from these relationships—economically, diplomatically, and even militarily—and at present there appears to be no force capable of halting its expansionist momentum,” particularly prior to its deeper engagement in the war.

A report by The Arab Weekly states that “Saudi Arabia’s role in Sudan extends beyond diplomacy to include practical efforts to influence the stance of the Sudanese army, as the Kingdom wields considerable influence over military leaders. Sudanese officials have publicly acknowledged Riyadh’s contribution.”

At the same time, a report by Sudan Tribune explains that the Sudanese army and its Islamist allies are employing various drones “ranging from Iranian models such as the Mohajer-6—which constitutes the backbone of the air force—to Turkish Bayraktar drones.”

According to the newspaper, “based on reports by United Nations experts and Amnesty International, several parties are believed to have contributed to supplying drones to the conflict’s sides, including Iran and Turkey to the army.”

From Sudan to Yemen, an analysis by Al-Youm Al-Thamen for Media and Studies observes that while “Saudi Arabia has escalated its media rhetoric regarding developments in southern Yemen, it has markedly softened its discourse toward the Houthi movement, raising questions about the future shape of the Kingdom’s alliances within Yemen.”

The analysis notes that “Saudi media rhetoric witnessed a notable shift during December 2025. Opposition to the South Arabian independence project in Yemen had effectively begun in 2023, coinciding with negotiations over the Saudi–Iranian agreement. However, the Southern Transitional Council’s moves to wrest the Hadramout Valley and Desert from forces of the First Military Region loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood intensified the tone of this rhetoric.”

Observers suggest that these recent shifts indicate a transition from open confrontation to calibrated restraint in managing escalation ceilings amid the ongoing war between the United States and Israel on one side and Tehran on the other, a conflict in which Iranian actions have crossed red lines.

Yet in light of Saudi–Iranian rapprochement and channels of understanding with the Houthis, it appears that new rules of engagement have been defined.

The disparity in strike figures illustrates this: the United Arab Emirates, for example, reportedly endured approximately one thousand attacks, compared with only around ten strikes against Saudi Arabia, and those against largely non-strategic targets.

From another perspective, observers contend that one indirect symptom of Iran’s war is an attempt to redraw the Gulf’s economic center of gravity by undermining the image of the region’s most stable economic hub—the United Arab Emirates.

While such a goal may yield no immediate military or political gain for Iran amid fierce battles, it serves a contest over reputation and status for a city such as Dubai in the race for regional influence.

Returning to Africa, geopolitical researcher Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, in an analysis for the Gulf International Forum, an independent Washington-based institute, argues that “Saudi Arabia has long sought to showcase its financial power to bolster its soft influence in sub-Saharan Africa. For years, Riyadh has attempted to compete with the substantial influence of fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member, the United Arab Emirates.”

He notes that “the UAE has pursued an active engagement policy across Africa over the past decade, with Abu Dhabi emerging as a leader in port development and maritime cooperation. DP World, its state-owned giant, manages projects in Djibouti, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Senegal. These initiatives have made the UAE the fourth-largest investor in Africa globally, after the United States, China, and the European Union.”

He cites, for example, “a study by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry showing that Emirati investment in Africa accounted for 88 percent of total Gulf Cooperation Council investments on the continent between January 2016 and July 2021—amounting to nearly $1.5 billion—an achievement that required formidable efforts on the part of the UAE.”