OPINION: How the Muslim Brotherhood shapes Sudan’s war

By Amos Kaberia

International observers — such as the Council on Foreign Relations, which characterizes Sudan’s brutal war as a power struggle between competing military factions led by two rival generals — often portray Sudan’s violence in bilateral terms. On one side is the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and on the other is Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. However, this description elides a wider ideological dimension, namely the infiltration of the SAF  and key state institutions by Muslim Brotherhood–aligned actors, which subscribe to an international Islamist ideology. 

As Asharq Al-Awsat reported, Muslim Brotherhood branches are an integral part of the SAF. Known locally as the “Kizan” — the Muslim Brotherhood rooted Islamist cadre that sustained the former president Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade rule — the movement embedded its members throughout military academies, command structures, and internal security organs, while sidelining independent officers. Recent reports estimate that the Muslim Brotherhood comprises 75% of the SAF. Their prevalence within the security apparatus shows that the 2019 uprising removed a president, but not the Islamist-military system that sustained him.  

Consequently, as international actors – notably the Quad (the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) – seek a peace agreement, they must approach negotiations with skepticism, recognizing that they are engaging an entrenched Muslim Brotherhood infrastructure. Burhan has effectively served as a Trojan horse for the restoration of this Islamist movement. To international audiences, such as in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Burhan portrays himself as the defender of Sudan’s sovereign institutions against a rogue RSF, referencing RSF’s brutality – which is beyond dispute –  to argue that international support for the SAF is both necessary and morally justified. This framing is incomplete because it ignores Burhan’s role in empowering the RSF before the war and in elevating equally dangerous Islamist elements within the Sudanese military. 

The Islamist Comeback: Burhan, Kober, and the Re-Militarization of the Kizan 

The April 2023 release of leading Islamists from Kober Prison demonstrated the SAF’s partnership with radical Islamist forces, which at times even overlap with ISIS. Sudan watchers noted that their release was “not an accident,” particularly given the proximity of the SAF to the Sudanese Islamist movements. Notably, the SAF allowed the release of Ahmed Haroun, a high-ranking official in the Bashir regime who served in several key ministerial and gubernatorial roles. Haroun’s release was not an isolated case.

Other Islamists freed at the same time included Ali Osman Taha, a powerful Islamist in the Bashir administration, as well as Osama Abdallah, who helped oversee the Shadow Brigades, an umbrella group of various Islamist militias. Together, these Islamicist operatives, free from imprisonment, significantly influenced Burhan and the SAF. Consequently, Burhan is largely dependent on  Islamist forces, who themselves fall under the direct control of the global Muslim Brotherhood. 

The Shadow Brigades and Ali Karti’s Hidden Hand 

Freed Islamists found a ready network in the aforementioned Shadow Brigades, which provided them with ample opportunity to pursue their Islamist ambitions. Within the Shadow Brigades, the El Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade (BBMB) stands out as a radical Islamist militia, which provides active support to the SAF. To thwart the BBMB’s Islamist  – and Muslim Brotherhood – goals for destabilization in the region, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the BBMB in September 2025.  

The BBMB represents the paramilitary arm of a deeper political infrastructure led by Ali Karti, the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. Karti works to promote Islamism and to oppose democratic institutions  within Sudan. Operating from Port Sudan, Karti wields the true executive power behind the scenes, with Burhan executing Karti’s Muslim Brotherhood directed command.  

This arrangement mirrors the operational model perfected by Hamas: an ostensibly local armed force whose military, political, and financial components are guided by the Muslim Brotherhood. Similar to its relationship with Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood controls the SAF through aligned militias, shadow leadership, and external financing. 

The SAF has another similarity with Hamas: its support from an international "Axis of Resistance.” The SAF has become the beneficiary of an alliance of state sponsors, which fuel Burhan’s war machine. Turkey provides the lethal backbone of this support through Akinci and Bayraktar drones, which have granted the SAF an aerial edge. Iran has supplied Mohajer-6 drones in exchange for strategic Red Sea access, a move that aligns with Tehran’s playbook of empowering proxies to expand its regional footprint.

Additionally, Qatar offers political and financial backing to the SAF. All this external backing works in coordination with the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the BBMB’s ideologies. By the time the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the BBMB in September 2025, the blueprint was already complete: a supposedly national force functioning as a Muslim Brotherhood proxy. 

The Trump administration has recognized the threat that the Muslim Brotherhood poses. This year, it imposed terrorist designations on Muslim Brotherhood branches in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. However, why did the U.S. administration give the Sudanese branch, the SAF, a pass? To further the negotiations with SAF?  

Burhan has already proven himself unwilling to compromise before the Quad’s peace overtures. For the last two years, he has rejected multiple peace offers – there is no evidence that turning a blind eye to the SAF’s radical ideology will change things.  

Rather than appease Burhan and his Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, the U.S. needs to recognize that the SAF’s underlying Islamist ideology is an insurmountable obstacle. Diplomacy with the SAF is destined to fail given the Islamist core that determines SAF policy.

Washington should therefore extend its January 2026 terror designations to include the SAF’s senior command and the Sudanese Islamic Movement that directs it. If the international community is serious about ending the war, it must confront the radical Islamist ideology driving the SAF instead of treating its leadership as a legitimate political interlocutor.