'Wrath of God': Israel's response to 1972 Munich massacre
The name of the memorial site "Erinnerungsort Olympia-Attentat" (Place of remembrance of the Olympic attack) in different languages is seen at the Olympic Park in Munich, southern Germany on August 17, 2022. (Photo by INA FASSBENDER / AFP)
Audio By Vocalize
The killing of 11 Israelis at the 1972 Munich Olympics
prompted Israel to turn to a strategy which endures to this day: deploying
secret operatives abroad to assassinate its enemies.
Ever since the Mossad intelligence service embarked on its
Operation "Wrath of God" to hunt down senior militants it blamed for
the Munich bloodbath, it has covertly targeted Israel's enemies overseas.
Half a century ago next week, Palestinian gunmen from the
Black September militant group broke into the Olympic village and stormed the
quarters of the Israeli athletes and their coaches.
After a violent hostage drama, worsened by the blunders of
German security services, all the Israelis were dead -- sparking deep dismay in
the Jewish state less than three decades after the Holocaust.
"It was a real shock for the Israeli population,"
recalls Ehud Barak, a former Israeli prime minister who at the time served as a
commando leading an elite military unit.
"The combination of the nature of the assassinations and
the helplessness of the athletes who were attacked and the fact that it was on
German soil somehow resonates," he told AFP.
The killings sparked "deep sorrow with a lot of
outrage" and a concerted drive to "take revenge, to kill (the) people
involved" and to prevent similar attacks in the future, he said.
The clandestine programme was spearheaded by then Mossad
chief Zvi Zamir, prime minister Golda Meir and her counterterrorism adviser
Aharon Yariv, said historian Michael Bar-Zohar.
Initially, "after Munich, Golda Meir didn't know what to
do", Bar-Zohar said.
The two security chiefs, both with "the air of
university professors", met Meir, the Israeli historian said.
"They were timid, well-dressed, and said one thing: 'Now
we must destroy Black September'."
The trio, aware it would be nigh impossible to hunt down all
members of Black September, instead devised a strategy of "smashing the
head of the serpent" by killing the group's leadership, said Bar-Zohar.
"Golda really hesitated," he said. "Should she
authorise assassinations throughout Europe and the Middle East?
Over the next few months, the heads of Black September and
their allies from the Palestine Liberation Organization began to die in
mysterious circumstances in Rome, Paris and Cyprus.
Among those targeted were three Palestinians, who were killed
in Beirut in April 1973 by a hit squad dressed in women's clothing.
One of the operatives disguised with make-up and fake breasts
was Barak, then a commander of the Sayeret Matkal unit deployed to kill
Mohammed Youssef al-Najjar, Kamal Adwan and Kamal Nasser.
The hit squad travelled by naval vessel, then smaller
speedboats to reach Beirut, where they were met by Mossad agents with rental
cars posing as tourists.
The team anticipated that more than a dozen young men walking
through an upmarket area of Beirut could arouse suspicion.
"So we decided to 'make some of us girls'," said
Barak, now 80. "I was the commander of the unit, but I had a baby face at
the time, so I was one of the girls.
"I was a brunette, not a blonde, with lipstick and blue
on the eye, and we took some military socks to fill our breasts," he
recalled.
The four agents disguised as women wore wide trousers, hiding
weapons in jackets and bags, and were armed with hand grenades and explosives.
Splitting up into small groups, they headed toward the homes
of their targets but came under heavy fire. Two Israelis were killed, along
with several Lebanese civilians and the three Palestinians.
Within hours, Barak was back home in Israel, where his wife
quizzed him on the eyeshadow and lipstick smeared across his face.
"I couldn't tell her," the ex-premier recalled,
adding that happily "she turned on the radio and there were discussions
about what had happened".
Such early successes may have made Israel overconfident,
however, contributing to subsequent failures.
Three months after the Beirut operation, Mossad believed they
had located Ali Hassan Salameh, Black September's head of operations, known as
the "Red Prince".
Israel dispatched assassins to the Norwegian town of
Lillehammer where, in a case of mistaken identity, they killed the Moroccan
waiter Ahmed Bouchikhi.
The hit squad was "too sure of themselves", said
Bar-Zohar, who has authored a series of books about Israeli intelligence
including the Norway operation.
"They arrived in Lillehammer with false information...
They were already fairly certain that it was a routine operation and they
ignored all the evidence that proved it wasn't him," he said.
"For example, they saw that the man they were following
lived in a run-down neighbourhood, that he rode a bicycle, that he went alone
to the swimming pool. A terrorist chief doesn't do that."
After killing the wrong man, three Israeli agents were
arrested by Norwegian police and spent 22 months in prison.
Undeterred, Mossad pushed on with a years-long operation to
ensnare Salameh.
Israel deployed an operative code-named "D" to
Beirut, who befriended the Palestinian and his beauty queen wife Georgina Rizk.
D, in a 2019 documentary aired by Israel's Channel 13,
described his time undercover as "my real life" in Beirut, where he
frequented a sports club with Salameh and studied his habits and movements.
"I considered him at the same time a friend and a mortal
enemy," D said. "It's not easy. You know, deep down inside, that he
must die."
In January 1979, nearly five years after the start of the
operation, Salameh was killed by a car bomb in Beirut.
The assassination of a top Black September member did not end
the killing spree.
Israel instead turned its sights on other targets, such as
those it blamed for attacks on Israelis during the first Palestinian Intifada,
or uprising, as well targets from its arch-enemy Iran.
Ronen Bergman, author of the book "Rise and Kill
First" about Israel's targeted killings, said the Munich attacks made
Israel realise "there would be no-one else" to protect its own
interests and citizens.
"There is a direct link between what happened then and
what we see now," he said.
Today "Israel is using targeted killings as one of its
main weapons in its policy of defending national security interests," he
said.
Bergman pointed to the death of top Iranian nuclear scientist
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, whose assassination outside Tehran nearly two years ago was
blamed on Israel.
The author said that, while targeted killings were
"really effective" against the organisers of attacks against
Israelis, "there is still a debate about how effective are the
assassination of nuclear scientists that started back in 2007".
"Those are very hard to measure, but it is clear that
Israel is continuing with the same kind of policy."
Israel accuses Iran of seeking to develop a nuclear weapon, a
goal which Tehran denies, and vehemently opposes negotiations between the
Islamic republic and world powers reviving the frayed 2015 nuclear deal.
Few expect Israel's "shadow war" with Iran, and
Mossad's clandestine operations, to end anytime soon.
Earlier this year, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said his
country will do "whatever we must to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
capability".


Leave a Comment